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Caught in the Headlights

CAUGHT IN THE HEADLIGHTS:
REVISING THE ROAD KILL HYPOTHESIS
OF ANTEBELLUM ILLINOIS BANK FAILURES
Scott Clayman
scclayman@gmail.com
Scott Deacle
Ursinus College
Department of Business and Economics
sdeacle@ursinus.edu
Andrew Economopoulos
Ursinus College
Department of Business and Economics
aeconomopoulos@ursinus.edu
Illinois had a dismal free banking experience, with over 80% of its
free banks failing by the start of the Civil War. Researchers agree
that a dramatic change in bond prices was the catalyst, and some
have shown that the riskiest banks, ex ante, were the most likely to
fail. This study examines how Illinois free banks adjusted their
portfolios in the face of increased political and financial risks
prior to Abraham Lincoln’s election as president. Lincoln’s
nomination in May 1860 and the Democratic Party schism in June
1860 raised the likelihood of secession and the potential for a
significant decline in Southern bond prices. Given this heightened
risk, did free bankers reduce their exposure to such a decline? In
general, it appears that the free bankers took risks commensurate
with expected returns and the uncertain political climate,
purchased the most readily available bonds, and had sufficient
backing to withstand a moderate decline in Southern bond prices.
The dramatic price decline soon after the election appears to have
caught many banks by surprise, like a deer caught in the
headlights.
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Introduction
Contemporary observers of the pre-Civil War, or antebellum, US
banking system frequently characterized it as being chaotic, with episodes
of “wildcat” banking. Without sound regulation, bankers ran fly-by-night
operations that mainly issued notes without serving as functional
intermediaries, according to this view (Hammond 1957 and Knox 1903).
For example, in Illinois from 1851 to 1861, 91 out of 112 free banks closed
without the ability to redeem their notes at par. Economic historians have
sought to find alternative explanations for the system’s relatively frequent
bank failures. Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber’s (1983, 1984) reviews
of antebellum banking suggest the failures were caused not by lack of
regulations but rather by a particular regulation: the requirement for free
banks to hold long-term bonds to back their banknotes, which were shortterm liabilities. This regulation was a recipe for bank panics when bond
prices experienced significant downturns. The ex post evidence is clear.
When bond prices dropped significantly, bank panics ensued, and some
unprepared banks failed.
Gerald Dwyer and R.W. Hafer (2004) examine whether loosely
regulated banks took excess risks or were instead impacted by a sudden,
unexpected crash in bond prices. In other words, were bankers reckless in
their decisions, like a groundhog that, without looking before crossing,
slowly waddles across a busy road? Or were they like the proverbial deer,
crossing a seemingly dark rural highway at night, only to be surprised by
the appearance of the headlights of a speeding automobile before
becoming “road kill?” Although the sudden decline in bond prices was a
factor in bank failures, Dwyer and Hafer also found that ex ante (measured
before panics) bond portfolio risk exposure to runs on notes were also
associated with an increased probability of failure. Matthew Jaremski
(2010) extends Dwyer and Hafer’s work by linking the probability of
failure to a lack of diversification within a bank’s asset portfolio. Jaremski
found that banks with more loans and fewer notes (which corresponded to
lower investment in bonds) were less likely to fail.
These studies, however, do not examine whether free bank managers
adjusted their portfolios to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy as new
risks became apparent. Such adjustments may not have prevented failure,
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but they may have reduced losses to noteholders and, ultimately,
stockholders. In addition, these studies used bond data with missing prices
for some of the bonds held by the Illinois free banks that could have
changed the bank’s estimated risk-return profiles. In this study, we
incorporate bond price data from a new source, the American Railroad
Journal, in which 40 months of prices from 1856-1859 are available. We
add this to existing data available in the Richard Sylla, Jack Wilson, and
Robert Wright online database on early US security prices (available at
http://eh.net), Dwyer, Hafer, and Weber’s (1999) research on bond prices
of the era, The Banker’s Magazine and Statistical Register, and reports
written by the Illinois State Auditor—an agency that kept data on free bank
bond transactions over time. These data will provide a more complete
assessment of the risk of the free banks. A detailed description of this data
is available in the Appendix.
Furthermore, this study will include an analysis of bond portfolio
composition and bond transactions by Illinois free banks prior to two
significant drops in bond prices – one associated with the Panic of 1857
and one associated with Abraham Lincoln’s election as President in
November 1860. Following the Republican Party’s nomination of Lincoln
for president in May 1860, the corresponding increase in the default
probability of bonds issued by Southern state governments could have
been anticipated by many free bank managers.1 We do not expect all of
them to have adjusted their portfolios, but at the margins we expect at least
some to have adjusted their portfolios to adjust their risks, given that a full
five months passed before Lincoln’s election. The events in the months
leading up to the election should have provided sufficient uncertainty
regarding debt issued by Southern state governments to encourage free
bank managers to reduce risk in their portfolios. By looking at portfolio
management during this period, the analysis will provide evidence to help
answer the question of whether free bankers were active managers of risk
with a goal of preventing failure.
We use the term “Southern states” to denote those states that
allowed slavery. Later in the paper we identify Border States as slave
states that did not join the Confederacy.
1
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We examine Illinois free banks’ risk management practices using
measures related to their bond holdings over time. With the assembled
data, it is possible to examine whether they properly accounted for
historical bond price volatility when constructing their bond portfolios.
We estimate the portfolios’ value at risk (VaR), yields on the bonds, and
bond price volatility to help assess Illinois free bank managers’ risk-return
decisions. We also develop a measure of bond availability to determine
whether banks were purchasing the most readily available bonds in the
months leading to Lincoln’s election. By looking at these measures near
key events and the changes that free banks made to their bond holdings in
response to those events, we assess whether banks prudently managed the
risk of Southern secession before the election of 1860.
Background: Free Banking in Illinois
As in in most states that allowed free banking, the 1851 Illinois free
banking law was modeled after legislation passed in New York in 1838
which had worked effectively there. The law granted banks charters
without requiring legislative approval as long as the banks met certain
capital requirements. These requirements included a minimum investment
of $50,000 in certain types of state or federal bonds that were deposited
with the Illinois State Auditor. Stockholders were personally liable for
bank debts up to the amount of their investment in the bank, a
responsibility known as double liability. For the purposes of securing
bank notes, the values of US and state bonds were set equal to their average
prices in the previous six months of trading in New York City. Prior to
1857 banks were allowed to issue notes in amounts up to 100 percent of
this measure of market value, with some additional restrictions based on
the bond’s coupon rates. Starting in 1857 banks would receive notes equal
to 90 percent of the market valuation up to the bonds’ par values, but they
could not issue notes in excess of their bond’s par value (Illinois General
Laws 1857, 24). After Lincoln’s election and the ensuing crash in
Southern bond prices, the legislature restricted note-backing bonds to
Illinois and US bonds. The free banking system in Illinois would end soon
after, when the legislature enacted an entirely new banking system to be
approved by referendum at the November 1861 election.
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Free banknotes functioned as paper currency. By law, each bank was
required to redeem its notes on demand for gold specie. Free banks
therefore exchanged their notes with the public in order to issue loans as
well as to increase their gold specie reserves (Rolnick and Weber 1988).
The law also included a provision that charged the bank commissioners to
“inspect the securities filed …so as to determine whether or not any
change has been made…in respect to the sufficiency of such securities to
meet the liabilities” (Illinois General Laws 1851, 171). If they judged that
some banks’ securities were found to be insufficient to meet the liabilities,
the commissioners issued “calls” on those banks requiring them to post
additional securities as collateral or turn in banknotes within 90 days.
Prior to 1857, the bank commissioners reported to the legislature that they
had made calls, but there was no public record of the banks that were
called. A new set of commissioners were named in 1857, and under their
charge the names of the banks, the amounts of their deficiencies, and the
deadlines to comply with the calls were made public. Between 1857 and
1861, five calls were made: Two in 1857, prior to that year’s “Panic”; one
in early 1860 after a significant drop in Missouri bond prices; one in late
1860 after the presidential election; and one in April 1861 after the firing
on Fort Sumter (Illinois Bank Commissioners 1858 and 1861, Banker’s
Magazine 1860).2 In some cases free banks chose to close, and the Illinois
auditor sold the bonds in New York City. If the Illinois auditor did not
have sufficient funds to fully redeem the notes, noteholders were
compensated in gold specie based on their pro rata share of the bank’s
outstanding note circulation (Illinois General Assembly 1851, 167-169).
Facing Price and Call Risk
Between the law’s enactment in 1851 and the first year of Lincoln’s
term in 1861, 91 Illinois free banks failed. As evidence that bond price
risk was a significant challenge for bank managers, 89 banks closed during
times of falling bond prices. Absent a system-wide panic or the prospect
2

The cited reports can be found in volumes for the years in the
parenthetical citations, even though some of the reports were not written
in those years.
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of secession and war, bond price risk largely depended on the issuing
state’s financial and economic conditions. In addition, many state
governments issued bonds for internal improvements, typically railroads.
In Missouri, for example, the bonds were issued to railroads that in turn
sold them to raise capital for improvements. The railroads paid the
equivalent of coupons to the state so it could pay bondholders. The failure
of a bond-funded project increased the burden on the state’s general
budget, decreased the certainty of bond payments, and drove prices down.
As the likelihood of secession increased during the late 1850s and early
1860s, the default risk on Southern-state government bonds developed a
component of political risk.
These risks were compounded by “call risk,” the possibility that
Illinois’ bank commissioners would issue a call on a bank because its
bonds’ value had declined more than 10 percent. If banks’ bond portfolios
were not well-diversified, a decline in a single bond’s price could lead the
bank commissioners to require more collateral. Banks typically received
90 days to comply. This call would also alert the bank’s noteholders to
heightened redemption risk, leading them to demand specie.
Bank managers could manage these risks several ways. One way, of
course, was to purchase bonds with low ex ante risk of default. Portfolio
diversification offered another avenue for risk management. As Jaremski
(2010) and Andrew Economopoulos (1990) show, free banks could further
mitigate their risks by increasing the proportions of loans and specie on
the assets sides of their balance sheets. Increases in loans, which primarily
had short terms to maturity in the antebellum era, reduced liquidity risk.
Increasing specie relative to notes reduced redemption risk. The banks
could also diversify their liabilities by increasing deposits relative to
banknotes.
The Bond Market Facing Illinois Free Bankers
For free bankers to diversify and manage risk, they needed access to
a wide variety of bonds with prices near market value. Howard Bodenhorn
(2000) argues that by the middle of the nineteenth century the US financial
market was sufficiently advanced for all participants to understand the risk
and return choices they faced. Greater technological capacity had recently
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emerged, with some market news and orders travelling over telegraph
wires or railroads. Bond prices were quoted daily in major city
publications, small-town newspapers, and trade publications such as The
Bankers Magazine and American Railroad Journal. As the speed of
capital flows increased during the first half of the nineteenth century, US
financial markets became more integrated.
This integration was made possible through the network of
relationships between country banks, private banks and city banks. Illinois
free banks could access the New York City bond market through
correspondent New York City banks. They could also tap a network of
Illinois “private” banks with agents in New York City. (Private banks did
not issue notes but performed other bank functions. See Richard E. Sylla
(1976).) Bankers Magazine (1860) published a directory that shows
Illinois had 143 private bankers in 1860, 134 of which maintained
relationships with New York City agents.
Although it was becoming easier to buy and sell bonds, some bonds
appear to have been easier to buy and sell than others. To gain a sense of
which states’ bonds were most liquid during this time, we gathered data
published between June and July in each of the years 1858, 1859 and 1860
in The New York Daily Tribune, which reported when various bonds were
traded in the New York City market. Table 1 summarizes the assembled
data on state bond trading frequency on the Morning Board and Second
Board (afternoon trading). Four of the five most actively traded bonds in
the market were issued by Southern states. Banks appear to have had
access to Missouri, Tennessee and Virginia bonds on most days. Northern
state and United States bonds, however, changed hands less frequently and
in smaller amounts.
The light volume of Northern bonds could have been driven by limited
supply as well as high demand from banks that bought and held those
bonds to maturity. New York free banks, for example, could only use US
or New York bonds to back their bank notes. Southern bonds may have
traded more frequently than Northern bonds because they were issued
more frequently during this period (see the two rightmost columns of
Table 1). Contemporary researchers (Warga 1992; Pasquariello and Vega
2009) find that recently issued (“on-the-run”) bonds trade more frequently
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than “off-the-run” bonds. This relationship appears to have held in the
antebellum era as well.
Table 1: Bond Trading Activity in New York City and State Debt,
1858-1860
Morning Board^
Second Board^
Bond
Issuer

% of
Days
Traded

Average
Trade
(1,000s)

% of
Days
Traded

Average
Trade
(1,000s)

State Debt
1857
(Millions)+

# of State
Issues
1858-60*

MO
97%
$36.64
72%
$15.54
$25.0
2
TN
73%
$14.12
40%
$ 9.18
$10.6
3
VA
71%
$ 9.08
39%
$ 7.77
$27.5
2
1
NC
35%
$ 4.79
18%
$ 5.67
$ 9.1
3
3
OH
33%
$ 0.50
5%
$ 1.00
$24.0
2
4
US
12%
$ 2.54
$65.0
2
MI
6%
$ 4.78
$ 2.3
0
1
LA
4%
$ 7.17
2%
$ 1.67
$10.1
1
2
NY
3%
$ 0.50
$33.9
1
1
KY
3%
$ 1.17
$ 5.7
0
ILL
3%
$ 2.33
$12.8
1
1
GA
3%
$ 1.00
$ 3.7
2
5
MN
2%
$ 3.33
$ 5.3
1
Sources: ^ New York Daily Tribune, various issues, 1858-1860; +
Banker’s Magazine Vol. 12; 1. New York Times, Sept. 11, 1861; 2. New
York Times, Feb. 4, 1858; 3. New York Times, Nov. 29, 1858; 4. New York
Times, Jan. 6, 1860; 5. New York Times, Apr. 19, 1858 *Illinois Auditor
Ledgers
Based on bond issue dates recorded in the Illinois Auditor reports, it
appears that new bond issues occurred annually for almost all of the most
frequently traded states, but less often for the infrequently traded states.
The auditor reports indicate that free banks could easily acquire bonds of
infrequently traded states when they were newly issued. Several examples
suggest this was the case. One Illinois bond issue bore an issue date of July
1, 1859, but the Illinois auditor recorded eight free banks depositing
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$684,000 of these bonds during a two-week period before July 1, 1859
(suggesting a private placement) and another $432,000 in the two months
after. During that 10-week period, only three banks deposited non-Illinois
bonds. We find a similar pattern for New York bonds with issue dates in
July and August 1860. During those two months Illinois banks deposited
$110,000 of those bonds, which represented 49 percent of all New York
bonds deposited by Illinois free bankers. Ohio issued a bond on September
26, 1859, and $6,000 of that issue was deposited by an Illinois free bank
on September 30. Auditor records show $54,000 in Iowa bonds deposited
by two free banks within two months of their issue date (July 15, 1858),
even though Iowa bonds were not traded in New York City during this
period.
Thus, it appears that infrequently traded bonds were purchased by the
free banks, but it was through local markets and near the time of their issue.
The markets were integrated, and at times Illinois banks had a wide range
of bond options to diversify their portfolios, but there is evidence of a
liquidity advantage for recently-issued bonds. This would have given the
bonds of many Southern states, which issued bonds more frequently than
Northern states, an advantage in the marketplace. For banks that wanted
to make significant purchases—such as a new bank or a bank expanding
its note issue to support demand from a thriving agricultural economy—
Southern bonds were likely to be the most readily available.
The Panic of 1857, a Bumper Crop, and the Civil War Crisis
Our study focuses on the response of Illinois free banks to the
secession crisis. But to fully understand their response, we consider the
events associated with a period of turbulence related to Missouri bonds
and the broader financial crisis known as the Panic of 1857. At the
beginning of 1857, 48 free banks had deposited bonds at the Illinois
auditor. About 60 percent of the banknotes were backed by Missouri state
government bonds. Missouri bond prices dropped by 8 percent from the
beginning of the year to May 1, probably driven in part by the Supreme
Court’s March 1857 Dred Scott decision. Many of these bonds supported
the construction of railroads that connected eastern parts of Missouri with
the Kansas territory. “Bleeding” Kansas, as it was known at the time, was
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the subject of an intense battle between pro-slavery and “free soil” forces,
with free soil enthusiasts using railroads to move people and belongings
to settle the new territory and hence, control its politics on slavery. Charles
Calomiris and Larry Schweikart (1991) note that during this period, the
prices of Western railroad securities appear to have moved to some degree
in response to news about free soil prospects. The Dred Scott decision
was a setback to free soil interests for a number of reasons, among them
that it made the expansion of slavery in the territories more likely.
In response to the drop in Missouri bond prices, the bank
commissioners issued a call. All but two banks complied. Two months
later, on July 28, a second call was issued on 27 banks. They had until
November 6 to comply (Illinois State Journal, October 24, 1857). In the
meantime, the early features of the Panic of 1857 emerged. Commercial
paper rates rose, and the bond market experienced a broad decline in prices
as participants demanded liquidity. On October 12, New York City banks
suspended the payment of specie. At this low point in mid-October,
Missouri bonds had depreciated by 29 percent, while bonds from Illinois,
the second largest issuer in banks’ bond holdings, had depreciated an
average of 52 percent, mostly during the previous month. From that point,
bond prices recovered and returned to pre-crisis levels by the first of the
new year, and banks ended the suspension of specie by April 1858
(Bankers Magazine 1858; Calomiris and Schweikart 1991). As a result of
the call and market turbulence, however, six Illinois banks ceased
operations, with four of the six closing voluntarily and redeeming their
notes at par. The other two redeemed their notes below par (Illinois Bank
Commissioners 1858).
Following the Panic of 1857, the Illinois banking market began to
grow again, and the national bond market remained relatively stable until
1860. By the beginning of 1860, 75 banks were operating in Illinois, up
from 45 at the end of the Panic. In 1860, Illinois free bankers encountered
a mixture of good news from the farming-dependent Illinois economy and
troubling news from neighboring Missouri and the national political scene.
Regarding Illinois farms, George Dowrie (1913, 155) writes, “The year
1860…was the most prosperous one in the history of Illinois agriculture
up to that time. The crops were unparalleled in size and excellence… and
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bank currency was in great demand for crop moving.” Note issue
increased over 22 percent from January to October of that year, according
to the auditor’s records. On a more ominous note, in early 1860, the
Missouri Governor proposed a 15 percent increase in the state debt to
complete railroad projects, while the Legislature proposed a 25 percent
increase in the state government’s debt limit (Bankers Magazine 1860).
Although the legislation was never approved, the prospect of an increase
in the supply of Missouri bonds caused their prices to drop seven percent.
In response, the bank commissioners called 18 banks with insufficient
collateral. Some in the market, however, believed that a call would not
cause managers to suspend operations. Banker’s Magazine reported,
“The banks are allowed until the 1st of April to respond, and it is
possible that an improvement will take place in the stock market3
before the date which will render unnecessary any action on their
part.” (1861, 824)
As the magazine suggested, Missouri bond prices rebounded by the
call deadline (though they fell again later in 1860). All called banks
continued operations and made reports in October 1860. In fact, with the
agricultural sector demanding more notes, the number of banks had grown
to 101 by then.
The national political climate during this period was far from stable.
Some political leaders strived for compromise between the North and
South, but those following the news of the day could see forces splitting
the two sections of the country apart, particularly the pivotal 1860
presidential election.4 The Democrats convened to nominate a candidate
in April 1860, but they could neither agree on a candidate nor a platform
In those days, the securities that are now called “bonds” were called
“stock.”
4
Our information on the political environment immediately before the
Civil War comes from a standard college American history textbook,
Brinkley et al. (1991). We also draw from Hofstadter (1938) and the
"Republican Party Platform of 1860," posted online by Gerhard Peters and
John
T.
Woolley, The
American
Presidency
Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29620. Sept. 15, 2015
3
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and agreed to meet again in June. In May, a new party, the Constitutional
Union Party, emerged with its own candidate for president, Tennessee
Senator John Bell, and a platform advocating compromise to save the
Union. That same month, the Republicans nominated Lincoln on a
platform that opposed the expansion of slavery in territories that had not
been admitted to the Union as states, a position that Southern political
leaders would not accept. Reconvening in mid-June, the Democratic Party
split, with a Northern faction nominating Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas
and a Southern faction nominating Vice-President John C. Breckenridge.
Southern states had over $120 million in debt prior to the Civil War (New
York Times September 11, 1861, 2). Throughout the ensuing political
campaign, some Southern leaders warned that if the Republicans won,
Southern states would secede from the Union, a clear signal of increased
default risk in those states’ bonds.
Lincoln won the November presidential election without the electoral
votes of any Southern states. In the following month, Southern bond
prices dropped between 20 percent and 35 percent, prompting the Illinois
bank commissioners’ fourth call since 1856. The call list included 22 of
101 banks, 17 of which were on the previous call list. Within a month’s
time, the bank commissioners were ready to issue another call on “nearly
all the remaining banks, but refrained due to the impact it would have on
the financial markets” (Illinois Bank Commissioners 1861, 216).
Although the call and subsequent near-call were due to falling bond prices,
the situation appeared to be fundamentally different from those
surrounding previous calls. On previous occasions when bond prices had
dropped suddenly, such as the Missouri bond price dip in early 1860 noted
above, media coverage reflected perceptions that the declines were
temporary. In this case, however, with war looming, there was less
confidence that the market for Southern bond prices would rebound. The
fates of many Illinois free banks were sealed when Southern bond prices
fell an additional 30 percent after the shots that started the Civil War were
fired at Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. The Illinois legislature enacted
new requirements limiting new bonds to Illinois or US issues. Legislators
also discussed repealing the existing banking system. These two
legislative actions essentially put a hold on any action by the banks. Only
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a few banks submitted bonds to cover the call. Most reduced note
circulation or failed.
Free Bankers’ Portfolio Decisions: 1856-1860
It appears, ex post, that banks were reckless to hold significant
portions of their portfolios in Southern bonds. However, ex ante decisions
may show measured and prudent behavior given the information at hand,
perceived risks, expected returns, and availability of each state’s bonds.
To evaluate the free bankers’ decisions, we first give a general overview
of the changes in free banks’ bond holdings between October 31, 1856 and
October 31, 1860, just before the election. This general overview includes
summary statistics and a risk measurement that will reflect the ex ante
information available to free bankers—value at risk (VaR)—which many
banks calculate today to assess potential losses. Second we examine in
greater detail the changes in free banks’ bond portfolios during the crucial
period between May 15, 1860 (three days before Lincoln won the
Republican nomination) and October 31, 1860 (six days before Lincoln’s
election). We examine changes in the regional composition of bond
portfolios, the availability of each state’s bonds, and the possibility that
banks in Southern Illinois had a geographical affinity for Southern bonds.
Third, we examine two channels other than bond trading through which
free bankers could mitigate risk: increasing specie relative to banknotes
and limiting note issue. Fourth, we examine free bankers’ risk and reward
decisions before the 1860 election by examining bond flows, yields, and
yield-to-volatility ratios according to the bond issuers’ state, rather than
their region. Finally, we review several newspaper articles from the period
to give a sense of “the view from the ground.”
Changes in Free Bank Bond Portfolio Composition: 1856-1860
Illinois bankers could adjust their portfolios at the margins by avoiding
Southern bonds when enlarging their portfolios, or they could have
maintained their portfolios’ sizes by swapping Southern bonds with
Northern bonds. These adjustments would not only reduce call risk, but
more importantly also reduce stockholder losses in the case of a general
decline in Southern bond prices. To assess Illinois bankers’ responses to

13
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXV, 2017 (forthcoming)

Caught in the Headlights
market-wide increases in risk, we examine changes in their bond
portfolios’ composition around the Panic of 1857 and then from the end of
the Panic until the 1860 election. We use data from Illinois auditor reports
and business newspapers published during the period. A description of
the data and how they were gathered is in Appendix I.
Table 2 describes the movement of bonds between November 1856
and October 1858 for banks that survived the Panic and appeared in both
Illinois Auditor reports for those months. Illinois bank commissioners
made two calls in 1857. The table segments banks into those that were not
called and those that were. The groups differ in how they adjusted their
bond portfolios. Banks that were not called reduced their overall bond
holdings and, by extension, their banknote issues. Notably, they reduced
their Northern and federal bond holdings, which auditor records indicate
were primarily from Illinois, and Border state bonds, of which Missouri
bonds comprised 99 percent. (Border States were the four slave states—
Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri—that remained in the
Union during the Civil War.) The uncalled banks appear to have become
more conservative. Banks that were called increased their bond holdings
(and banknotes) with a significantly larger percentage going toward
Northern bonds—over 10 times their original holdings because they were
a small percentage of the portfolios to begin with. The movement
increased the Northern weight in the portfolios by eight percentage points.
Missouri bonds were a smaller percentage of both groups’ portfolios, with
the called group shedding over four percent of its (predominantly
Missouri) Border state holdings. Coupled with the growth of other
Southern bond holdings, the weight on called banks’ Border state bonds
fell 18.1 percentage points. The called banks made more substantial
changes than the uncalled banks, and they did this largely by shedding
more of the Missouri bonds that were most volatile during the Panic.
After 1857, the Illinois banking market recovered and grew. Table 3
summarizes Illinois free banks’ bond holdings in October 1858 and
October 1860, as reported by the Illinois auditor.5 Illinois free banks
5

No copy exists of a published bond report in 1859. A January 1860 bank
condition report did not include bond data.
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deposited bonds from 15 different state and federal issuers with the state
auditor. A majority were from Southern states, whose chances of seceding
increased substantially between 1858 and 1860. By the end of1860,
however, free banks moved towards Northern bonds, which grew from
17.2 percent to 31.5 percent of their portfolios.

Table 3: Illinois Free Bank Bond Portfolio Composition, Oct. 1858 and Oct. 1860
Oct. 1858
Oct. 1860
% Northern State and Federal Bonds
17.2%
31.5%
% Southern State Bonds
82.8%
68.5%
% Confederate State Bonds
34.2%
47.3.%
% Border State Bonds
48.6%
21.2%
Average Number of Bonds Held
3.08
3.74
Undiversified (Holding one state's bond)
16.7%
12.9%
Maximum Number of Bonds Held by One Bank
9
9
Percentage of Banks 100% Northern
6.3%
7.9%
Percentage of Banks 100% Southern States
54.2%
31.7%
Percentage of Banks 100% Confederate
33.8%
12.9%
Percentage of Banks 100% Border
10.4%
1.0%
Number of Banks
48
101*
Northern state and federal bonds include bonds issued by the Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, and Ohio state governments as well as the U.S. government. Sothern state bonds include
bonds issued by the state governments of Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Confederate state bonds come from those
Southern states except for two Border states, Kentucky and Missouri. Among banks with
undiversified portfolios in October 1858, two held only Illinois bonds, six held only Missouri, and
one held only Michigan. Among banks with undiversified portfolios in October 1860, three held
only Illinois bonds, two held only U.S. bonds, one held only Michigan, one held only Missouri,
and two held only Tennessee.
*The October 1806 report included 106 banks, but we exclude five that were winding down.
Source: Illinois Bank Commissioners Reports, 1858 and 1860
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Banks also continued to shift from bonds issued by Border States,
which were still primarily issued by Missouri. The movement from
Missouri bonds went in roughly equal proportions to bonds of states that
remained in the Union and bonds of states that joined the Confederacy.
The percentage of undiversified banks, holding only one state’s bonds, fell
from 16.7 percent to 12.9 percent. The fraction that exclusively held
Southern bonds declined from 54.2 percent to 31.7 percent percentage
points, while the fraction that exclusively held Northern bonds increased
slightly, from 6.3 percent to 7.9 percent. On average, Illinois banks held
bonds from 3.08 states in October 1858, a figure that rose to 3.74 in
October 1860. Thus, it appears that there were some modest adjustments
towards diversification and regional risk reduction.
Free Bank Bond Portfolio Value at Risk: 1858-1860
These adjustments, however, must be assessed in the context of the
perceived risks in the bond market and the banks’ entire bond portfolios.
The effect of adding a bond on a portfolio’s standard deviation depends on
the covariances of the new bond’s prices with those of the existing bonds
as well as the variance of the new bond relative to that of the portfolio.
Using weekly data on state bond prices, we estimated an ex ante
measurement of the price risk facing banks, their bond portfolios’ weekly
value at risk (VaR).6 As Table 4 shows, one year after the Panic of 1857,
banks that held portfolios of Southern bonds were exposed to lower price
risk than banks that held Northern bonds. On average, banks that were
6

In this study, we use the 1 percent VaR for weekly returns, which is an
estimate of the greatest weekly decline in the value of the portfolio that
would occur in 100 observations – the first percentile of possible returns.
Two years of weekly prices were used to calculate the VaRs. The general
formula for the VaR of the bond portfolio is: VaR = SDp * Zα, where SDp
is
the
standard
deviation
of
the
portfolio
SDp
=
2 2
𝑁
𝑁
√∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 𝜎𝑖 + ∑𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑉 (𝑅𝑖 , 𝑅𝑗 ) , wx is the portfolio

weight on bond i or j, COV(Ri, Rj) is the covariance of the returns on bonds
i and j, and N is the number of bonds in the portfolio. Zα is the first
percentile of the standard normal distribution (-2.326).
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called in early 1857 and tended to purchase Southern bonds had lower
VaRs. Thus, based on historical pricing patterns, banks reduced their
portfolios’ price risk by moving to Southern bonds in the aftermath of the
Panic.
In October 1860, the state bonds’ price risk, as calculated by VaR, was
substantially lower than in October 1858 (Table 4). This reflects the
relative calm that returned to the bond market after the Panic of 1857.
More than 80 percent of Illinois bank bond portfolios had VaRs of less
than 6 percent, well below the 10 percent decrease in value that, under
state law, triggered a call. There was, however, a substantial shift in the
way geography influenced VaR. At the end of October 1860, portfolios
with lower VaRs held greater proportions of Northern state bonds. The
strong demand for and short supply of Northern bonds, coupled with
strong supply of Southern bonds and increased political risk, led to VaR
increases for banks with greater proportions of Southern and Border state
bonds. The highest VaRs belonged to banks that held over 70 percent of
their portfolios in Southern bonds. Banks entering after the Panic were
likely to hold Southern bonds that had relatively low volatility during the
Panic but became more volatile in the following years.
To examine further whether banks that entered the Illinois market after
the Panic of 1857 were more conservative in their bond portfolio
selections, several regressions were run with VaR as the dependent
variable (Table 5). Model 1 is a simple univariate model to test if banks
that entered after 1857 (new) exhibited different VaR from those that
operated prior to the panic (established). A binary variable received a
value of one for observations on banks that entered post-panic, while
previously established banks received a value of zero. Model 2 adds the
bank portfolios’ percentage of Southern bonds as a control variable. In
Model 3, we examine if new banks’ proportion of Southern bonds reduced
VaRs by interacting the new bank binary variable with the Southern bond
percentage. Finally, Model 4 keeps the Southern bond percentage variable
but drops the new bank binary variable in favor of a binary variables that
takes the value of one depending on whether the banks deposited bonds
after May 1860, when Lincoln was nominated.
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Table 4: Value at Risk (VaR) of Bank Bond Portfolios in October 1858 and October 1860
October 1858
October 1860
All
Called Not Called
%
%
VaR
Banks in 1857 in 1857
Southern VaR
All Banks Southern
0-10.00
3
3
0
70.1%
21
30.3%
0-3.99
10.01-12.99
14
4
10
48.2%
4-4.99
39
59.5%
13.00-15.99
25
15
10
18.8%
5-5.99
22
70.0%
Over 16.00
6
0
6
9.0%
Over 6.00
19
12.3%
Average VaR
14.0
13.1
14.6
Average VaR
4.93
This table presents characteristics of Illinois bank bond portfolios categorized by their Value at Risk (VaR). The
column “Banks open in 1858” presents the number of banks in each VaR bucket that were open as of the Illinois
Auditor’s 1858 report. “Post-1858 Banks” presents the number of banks in each bucket that were open after that
report, while “Post-May 1860 Banks” presents figures for banks that opened after the May 1860 report.
Source: Illinois Bank Commissioner Reports, 1858 and 1860
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Table 5: VaR Analysis of 1860 Portfolios between Pre and Post 1857 Panic
(t-stats)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3 Model 4
Intercept
5.514
4.359
4.242
3.915
(34.8)*
(17.5)*
(11.46)* (16.5)*
New After 1858
-1.075
-0.830
-0.653
(-5.05)*
(-4.29)*
(-1.46)
% Southern Bonds in Portfolio
1.488
1.64
1.752
(5.40)*
(3.72)*
(6.15)*
New After 1858 * % Southern
-0.249
(-0.44)
Deposited After May 1860
-0.452
(-2.26)**
36.2%
R Squared
19.7%
37.5%
32.9%
101
Observations
101
101
101
*, ** Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% levels.
The results (Table 5) indicate that banks entering after the Panic, in
general, held portfolios with lower VaRs, as implied by the negative sign and
statistical significance of the New After 1858 coefficient in Models 1 and 2.
Without controlling for Southern bonds (Model 1), these banks’ VaRs were
107.5 basis points lower than those of established banks. When we control for
the percentage of Southern bonds in the portfolio (Model 2), the new banks’
VaRs were on average 83 basis points lower than established banks. Holding
constant the percentage of Southern bonds, new banks were apparently
selecting bonds that had greater price stability. If a bank held a portfolio of
100 percent Southern bonds, it would increase the bank's VaR by 148.8 basis
points, about 34 percent more (for an existing bank) than a bank with no
Southern bonds (Model 2). And if the new banks held portfolios of 100
percent Southern bonds, their VaRs would be higher than an established bank
by 65.8 basis points. In Model 3, the coefficients on both the new bank binary
variable and the interaction term are not statistically significant, perhaps
because the two variables are strongly correlated. We reserve discussion of
Model 4 for below.

Caught in the Headlights
Free Bank Bond Activity from Lincoln’s Nomination to the Eve of the
Election
If political risk contributed to banker's expectations, bond flow data should
show that banks deposited more Northern bonds relative to Southern bonds
between May, when Lincoln became the Republican candidate, and the
November 1860 presidential election. The auditor’s ledger records the date,
bond issuer, and amount of every free bank bond transaction during this time
period. Table 6 shows the flow of bonds from May 1860 to October 1860
(shortly before Lincoln’s election), with banks categorized as those that
existed in May 1860 and new entrants after May 1860. Existing banks added
Southern bonds, but they added Northern bonds at a faster rate. For new
entrants, however, Southern bonds clearly were the bonds of choice. Political
risk does not appear to have been the most important factor in bond purchases
for these banks.

Table 6: Percentage of Bond Flows between May 1860 and
October 1860
Bank Type
Northern
Southern
Border
New Entrants
29%
71%
0%
(n=20)
Existing Banks
62%
38%
0.3%
(n=81)
Source: Illinois Auditor Register of Bank Securities, 1854-1860
Table 6 illustrates overall differences in flows, but it does not show
whether banks added, subtracted, or swapped bonds, and whether these
transactions diversified their portfolios. Table 7 breaks bond transactions after
Lincoln’s nomination into three groups: adding bonds, subtracting bonds, and
swapping bonds. The table does not distinguish between new and existing
banks. All new banks added bonds to their portfolios during this period.
Consistent with a banknote expansion resulting from the bumper crop, more
than 50 percent of banks added bonds to their portfolios during this period.
Thirty-one banks diversified by adding bonds from states that they were not
holding prior to May 1860. Sixteen banks diversified their portfolio by adding
bonds from one area, nine added only Southern bonds, and seven added
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Northern bonds. Banks deposited two-and-a-half times more Southern bonds
than Northern bonds, and the banks that added Southern bonds exclusively
added a higher percentage relative to their portfolio values than those that
added Northern bonds exclusively. Among banks that added both Northern
and Southern bonds, more Southern bonds were added as a percentage of
portfolio values. Among the seven banks that withdrew bonds, none withdrew
bonds of both regions. Three banks withdrew Northern bonds only, and four
withdrew Southern bonds only. Nine banks swapped bonds from one state for
bonds from another. Five banks swapped Northern bonds for Southern bonds,
while one bank swapped Northern bonds for Southern bonds. All other swaps
involved bonds from the same region.

Table 7: Bond Transactions After Lincoln’s Nomination
Northern
Southern
Banks Adding Bonds+
Total
only
state^ only
Both
Number
54
8
22
24
Increased diversification
31
7
9
15
Value added in Par Value $2,917
$234
$939
N = $610
(thousands)
S = $1,132
% of Portfolio
28%
51%
N = 26%
S = 35%

Banks Withdrawing Bonds
Number

Total
8

Northern
only
3

Southern
state^ only
4

Both
0

Northern
Same
for
Southern
Region for
Southern
state for
Same
Total
state
Northern
Region
Banks Swapping Bonds
Number
9
5
1
3
^ Includes border states. + Banks that entered are included in this estimate. Thirtysix banks made no transactions.
Source: Illinois Auditor, Register of Bank Securities, 1860

21
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXV, 2017 (forthcoming)

Caught in the Headlights
This diversification was significant. At the time of Lincoln’s nomination,
managers of existing banks had to weigh the cost of adjusting their portfolios
in response to new political risks against the reduction in risk those
adjustments would bring. Returning to our regression analysis (Table 5),
Model 4 tests whether these adjustments were followed by lower VaRs. The
binary variable that takes the value of one for banks that made a transaction
after May is associated with a lower expected portfolio VaR of 45 basis points.
Thus, it appears that many bankers were broadening their portfolios and
lowering exposure to falling bond prices.
Bond Availability
We can rule out two possible explanations of bond transactions during this
time period: calls by the bank commissioners and replacement of maturing
bonds. There were no calls from May through October, and the auditor’s
records show no bonds on deposit with maturity dates during the period. Bond
availability, however, may have played a role in bankers’ choices. As noted
above, Illinois banks could purchase bonds on the New York City market, but
market data from the period indicate some bonds, particularly Southern bonds,
were more easily purchased there than others. We classify a bond as available
if there was sufficient trading in New York City to meet an individual banks
demand at a point in time. State i's bond is considered available for purchase
on the New York City market by bank j in week 0 when
𝑛

−1

∑ 𝐵𝐷ij0 < ∑ 𝐵𝑁𝑌𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑖=0

𝑡=−2

where BDij0 is the amount of bonds from state i deposited by bank j in the
current week (t = 0) and BNYCit is volume of bond i sold in New York City in
week t. We assume that the two weeks prior to the deposit was sufficient time
for a bank to review relevant bond transactions and prices in New York City
and place an order with its purchasing agent. If the right side of the equation
is greater than the left side, we deem this bond available to the bank for
purchase. There were 249 deposits made by Illinois free banks between May
15, 1860 and October 31, 1860. The number of bonds available at the time of
each deposit is illustrated in Figure 1 below. On average there were 5.8 bonds
available to free bankers. Our examination of the records finds that free banks
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with the fewest options (three bonds or less) were, in general, new entrants
from which the state required a minimum initial deposit of $50,000 in bonds.
Given that bonds issued by 13 different states and the federal government
traded in New York City then, free banks had access to about 45 percent of the
available issuers. Available bonds types, percentages of bonds purchased, and
average bond prices for the period are presented in Table 8. With the exception
of Missouri bonds, which were suffering from the state’s railroad trouble, there
is a strong correspondence between bond availability, price, and purchase by
Illinois free banks.
70
60

# of Deposit

50
40
30
20
10
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Bonds Available at Time of Deposit

Sources: N.Y. Daily Tribune, May-October, 1860. Illinois Auditor, Register
of Bank Securities, 1860
Figure 1
Availability of Bonds in New York City
Tennessee, Virginia, and North Carolina bonds were available nearly all
of the time, and they comprised two-thirds of free bank deposits during this
period. The only non-Southern bonds that were regularly available in New
York City at this time were US bonds, which comprised an additional 12
percent of free bank purchases. Table 8 also shows that premium bonds were
less available in New York City than discount bonds. Among premium bonds,
only US bonds regularly had sufficient trading volume to cover the amounts
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deposited by free banks. We find, however, that Illinois and New York bond
deposits recorded by the auditor exceeded their trading volume in New York
City. For Illinois bonds, this can be explained by the home state bonds’
availability through private bankers. The New York bonds likely came to
Illinois through private placements. In July of 1860, the New York state
government auctioned $1.2 million in bonds. One of the bidders was
Thompson Brothers, which had correspondent relationships with one rural
Illinois and two Chicago private banks (Bankers Magazine 1860).
Table 8: Availability of State Bonds for Purchase, May to October 1860
State
MO

% Available
100%

% of Purchases
0%

Average Price ($)
81.88

TN

99%

43%

90.23

VA

99%

12%

91.80

NC

89%

12%

97.41

US

80%

12%

102.23

IL

47%

7%

105.61

LA

42%

2%

97.58

KY

16%

0%

104.48

GA

10%

1%

103.11

OH

10%

1%

105.66

NY

6%

9%

101.26

MI

2%

1%

103.08

MN

2%

0%

NA

Notes: This table shows data on the availability of state and US bonds on the New
York City market and the frequency of their purchase by Illinois free banks between
May and October 1860. The “% Available” column shows the percentage of bond
deposit dates on which bonds issued by each issuer were available to free banks in
sufficient quantity on the New York market. The “% Purchases” column shows the
percentage of deposit dates on which each issuer’s bonds were deposited by Illinois
free banks. The “Average Price” column shows in dollars the average price of each
issuers bond between May and October 1860.
Sources: N.Y. Daily Tribune, May-October, 1860; Illinois Auditor, Register of Bank
Securities, 1860.
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In summary, the data provide evidence that free bank had choices, but
most of these choices were Southern bonds. Among non-Southern bonds, only
US bonds were available in sufficient quantity in New York City to meet free
banks’ needs at any given time. Illinois bonds and newly issued northern
bonds were also available through the alternative channel of private bankers.
These northern and US bonds traded at a premium, and the substantial
purchases of them during the period—US, Illinois, and New York bonds were
28 percent of free bank purchases—indicates that some free bankers were
willing to forsake yield for safety.
Geographical Preference
Table 8 above suggests that Tennessee bonds were both available and
attractive to Illinois free banks during this period. The relatively high current
yield could have motivated Illinois bankers to purchase them, but another
possible reason was an affinity among Southern Illinois bankers for bonds
from a relatively nearby area. We designate banks as from Southern Illinois if
they were located in that region as defined by George W. Smith in his history
of the area (1912). Today, this area is generally located south of US Interstate
Highway 70. Table 9 suggests that location was a factor, but not as one would
expect.

Table 9: Bond Purchasing Activity from May to October 1860,
According to Location
% of
Portfolio
% of
Northern
Deposits
State
of
Total
Bonds
# of Banks
Northern
Bonds
Before
Depositing
States
Deposited
May
# of
Northern
Location
Bonds
(millions)
1860*
Banks
Bonds
Northern Illinois
12%
$1.36
36%
26
11
Southern Illinois
44%
$1.68
32%
32
17
* Includes only banks operating prior to May, 1860.
Source: Illinois Auditor Register of Bank Securities, 1854-1860
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Northern Illinois banks made $1.36 million in bond deposits, 12 percent
of which were northern state (or federal) bonds. On the other hand, Southern
Illinois banks made $1.68 million deposits, 44 percent of which were northern
state bonds. Clearly, the Southern Illinois banks were selecting lower risk,
lower current yield bonds than their counterparts. Perhaps this region was
more sensitive to the political realities of what would happen if Lincoln won
the election.
A nuanced portrait of Illinois free bank bond purchases and risk
management emerges from the above analysis. Free banks were exposed to
considerable risks on the eve of the 1860 presidential election, with only a
minority of banks moving away from Southern bonds. After Lincoln’s
nomination more Southern bonds were purchased than Northern bonds. A
third of all banks diversified their portfolios during this period, but about half
of them moved towards intra-regional diversification rather than interregional security. These purchases, however, lowered their ex-ante price risk.
Even though Northern states, particularly Illinois in 1859 and New York in
1860, provided opportunities to free bankers by issuing new bonds, we
conclude that there was not a significant movement away from Southern bonds
even after the threat of Southern bond default increased when Lincoln was
nominated. Demand for banknotes drove bond purchases, and Southern bonds
on the whole had liquidity and yield advantages relative to Northern bonds,
meaning that the Southern bond exposure may not have been imprudent. In
fact, as measured by portfolio VaR, most banks were safe from declines in
bond portfolio values large enough to warrant a call from the bank
commissioners.
Use of Specie or Banknotes to Mitigate Bond Portfolio Risk
The preceding evidence suggests that some free bankers managed their
bond portfolios’ price risk, but many exposed themselves to greater political
risk by holding Southern bonds. Perhaps they offset this risk by holding
greater levels of specie. If free banks were unable to exchange specie for notes,
the auditor was authorized to place the bank into liquidation. Since the value
of bonds fluctuated, specie could also offset bond portfolio price risk. That
said, banks may have held greater amounts of specie for other reasons. For
instance, they may have held deposits for retail customers or other banks which
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would require specie reserves. Additionally, the population of the surrounding
area may have influenced banks’ specie holdings. Less-populated areas, due
to their isolation, would have been less likely to face sudden surges in specie
demand and could minimize reserves. However, if the cost of acquisition of
specie was high for banks in small towns, they may have needed to keep larger
inventories of specie relative to city banks.
Of 106 banks listed on the auditor’s October 31, 1860 bond report, balance
sheet data are provided for 92.7 These data were used to estimate a simple
OLS regression model to assess whether bond portfolio risk is associated with
more specie relative to note issue, controlling for the population of the
municipality (in thousands) in which the bank operated, according to the 1860
US Census. The results were as follows:
Specie/
Banknote = 0.088 + 1.67(Dep/TL) - 0.00179(South Bonds) – 0.0083(Pop)
Ratio
t = (0.921) (6.98)***
(-1.45)
(-1.89)*
Adjusted R2 = 35.1%

Observations = 92

The results suggest that free bankers held larger reserves for banknotes as
deposits grew relative to liabilities, but the percentage of Southern bonds
backing notes had no impact on reserves. The bank location’s population did
impact specie holdings, as greater population was associated with less specie
relative to banknotes. Bank managers did not appear to weigh the bonds’
political risks when determining their specie reserves.
Free banks may not have held additional specie to mitigate political risks
because they viewed the regulatory overcollateralization of banknotes as
sufficient cushion for falling bond prices. Free banks could also have reduced
risk by reducing the issuance of banknotes. For each bank, we calculated a
7

Five of the listed banks were closing, but the auditor listed them if they still
had bonds in their possession. Nine of the listed banks were active but did not
submit a report either because they had only recently begun operations or they
simply failed to report.
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measure called the reserve cushion (RC), the market value of the bank’s bonds
plus its specie reserves less its banknotes, all divided by the market value of
the bonds:
RC = (MV of Bonds + Specie – Banknote Issue)/MV of Bonds
On October 1, 1860, one month before the Illinois Auditor’s November 1
report, 92 free banks submitted condition reports to the bank commissioners.
From the auditor’s bond ledgers we identified bonds submitted during the
month of October, except by those banks that entered the market in October.
By making adjustments to portfolios reported in the November auditor’s
report, we estimated the bond portfolios of free banks on October 1, 1860, 38
days before Lincoln’s election. The market value of each bank’s bond
portfolio was estimated using New York City prices for the first week of
October. If New York City prices were not available that week, we used prices
reported in other cities at that time. For Illinois and New York bonds with no
market price data, we used par value, a conservative estimate. Table 10 shows
free bank reserve cushion figures based on those calculations.

Table 10: Bank Reserve Cushions Before the 1860 Election
Activity After
% of
% of
Average RC
Lincoln’s
No. of Average
Banks
Banks
(with 10% decline
Nomination
Banks
RC
RC<0
RC<0
in Southern bonds)
Did not Deposit
44
23.7%
14%
17.1%
36%
Deposited Bonds
48
8.9%
6%
1.3%
42%
Only Southern
24
7.3%
12.5%
-1.3%
58%
Only North
8
13.1%
0%
8.8%
13%
Both
16
9.4%
0%
1.5%
38%
Notes: This table presents an analysis of Illinois free bank reserves on the eve
of the 1860 presidential election. Reserve cushion (RC) is the market value of
the bank’s bonds plus its specie reserves less its banknotes, all divided by the
market value of the bonds.
Sources: October 1, 1860 Bank Commissioner’s Report; November 1, 1860
Illinois Auditor Bond Report; Illinois Auditor Register of Bank Securities,
1854-1860
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Free banks that did not deposit bonds during this time appear to have been
waiting out the storm by holding an average reserve cushion of 23.7 percent.
However, had there been a call on October 1, 14 percent of those banks would
have been on the list with negative RCs. Banks that deposited bonds held a
reserve cushion near 9 percent, but a few of them, 6 percent, would have been
on the hypothetical call list. Breaking down the group according to regional
composition of deposits, we see that banks that deposited only Southern bonds
had the smallest average RC and the greatest proportion of banks with negative
RCs. Such banks would, on average, have held negative RCs if Southern bond
prices declined 10 percent. Banks purchasing Northern bonds, on the other
hand, held significant RCs (13.1 percent) and were better able to withstand a
10 percent decline in Southern bond prices.
Greater Risk Compensated by Greater Return
Free banks may have maintained their weights on Southern bonds because
they paid high enough yields to compensate for the risk. To estimate yields to
maturity (which were not published at the time) on bonds held by Illinois free
banks, we combined prices listed in newspapers with maturity dates and
coupon rates in the Illinois Auditor’s records. With some states issuing
multiple bonds with different maturity dates, we computed a yield-to-maturity
“index” for each state using the mid-points of the set of maturities of each
state’s bonds outstanding. We also estimated indexes of current yields, which
paralleled yields to maturity for these bonds. As Table 11 shows, bond
purchases generally followed yields except for Missouri and US bonds. Four
of the top five bond purchases by free banks were also bonds that happened to
be the most actively traded in New York City (Table 1). Missouri yields were
the highest at the time, but no bank was willing to add them as collateral after
May. In fact, during this time period banks were shedding Missouri bonds.
Yet bankers were willing to take the risks associated with Tennessee, Virginia,
and North Carolina bonds, which carried relatively high yields compared to
Northern and federal bonds.
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Table 11: Net Flows and Average Yields of Selected Bonds
from May 1860 to Oct 1860

Bonds

% of
Total Net
Flow

Average
Yield to
Maturity
6.70%

Average
Current
Yield
6.61%

YieldVolatility
Ratio*
.0546

Tennessee

46.0%

Virginia

12.0%

6.70%

6.54%

.0763

US

10.7%

4.61%

5.55%

.0785

Illinois 6’s

10.1%

5.30%

5.69%

NA**

North
Carolina

9.9 %

6.20%

6.13%

.0414

Louisiana

2.0%

6.17%

6.19%

.0226

Ohio

0.1%

5.43%

5.46%

.0502

Missouri

-1.3%

7.9%

7.38%

.0935

*One week forecast for the week of November 2, 1860.
**Insufficient price data to make calculation.
Source: Illinois Auditor Register of Bank Securities, 1860.
To examine further whether weighting portfolios heavily with riskier
southern state bonds could be justified ex ante by higher expected rewards, we
estimated reward-to-volatility ratios at the time of Lincoln’s nomination for
bonds for which we had sufficient data on market prices. We use the bonds’
yields to maturity to measure reward and estimates of the standard deviation
of their prices to measure volatility. The standard deviation estimates are
generated with ARCH(1) models of the bond prices (see Appendix II for
details). While the reward-to-volatility measure is imperfect—yield to
maturity doesn’t measure expected return and price volatility doesn’t
correspond to yield—the figures give a reasonable approximation of the riskreturn combination these bonds presented their holders. Our calculations
indicate that the greater volatility of Southern and Border state bonds was in
many cases compensated by proportionally greater yields. The two most
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purchased Southern bonds (Tennessee and Virginia) had greater reward to
volatility ratios than Ohio bonds. Even though these bonds carried greater
price risk, they compensated holders with expected return commensurate with
that risk. The third most purchased bond (US) had the second-highest rewardrisk ratio, but also the lowest yield. A final point is that Illinois free banking
regulations prevented note issue greater than bonds’ par values. For bonds that
sold above par, in this case Ohio and US bonds, free banks’ effective return on
banknote issue was lower than for bonds selling at or below par. This may
also help explain why those bonds were in less demand.
The View from the Ground in 1860
Although in hindsight, it seems clear that the United States was heading
toward civil war in 1860, it may not have been as apparent to those living then.
The evidence of diverse activity within the banking system could reflect the
variety of news bankers received about the election. Newspapers of that period
presented diverging opinions about the likely outcome of the election and the
implications if Lincoln won. Reviewing presidential candidates’ positions, the
Clarksville (Tennessee) Chronicle commented that “the defeat of the
Republican party is of the most vital importance…Mr. Lincoln and his cohort
of abolitionists is making a desperate attempt to curtail the growth and spread
of this Southern tree (slavery), and if possible to uproot it entirely.” The
Glasgow (Missouri) Weekly Times wrote that the split in the Democratic Party
would lead to a Lincoln victory, but added that “Old Abe would cure them of
secession.” In Illinois there was an expectation of Lincoln being elected, but
some argued that it would not cause great change. The Ottawa (Illinois) Free
Trader published an article that claimed that Lincoln and the Republicans had
actually endorsed the Dred Scott decision
Even after Lincoln’s election, it was not clear whether all slave states
would secede. Some, primarily in the heavily slave-dependent cotton belt, left
the Union almost immediately. But others, including Tennessee, did not leave
until Lincoln called for troops after the skirmish at Fort Sumter. In the
presidential election, Tennessee (along with Virginia and Kentucky) gave its
electoral votes to John Bell, a centrist candidate. Furthermore, in a statewide
referendum on February 9, 1861, a majority of Tennessee voters rejected a
proposed secession convention (Memphis Daily Appeal February 21, 1861, 2).
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The bank commissioners commented on the default risk of Tennessee bonds
in their January 11, 1861 report, writing that the “State would be amply able
to provide payment for their indebtedness…” (Illinois Bank Commissioners
Report 1861, 215). If the bank commissioner’s views were widely held by
others in the market, the significant increase in purchases of Tennessee bonds
made reasonably sound business sense. Relative to other states, the relatively
low economic and political risks for the bonds coupled with a high yield would
have made the bonds an acceptable choice.
Conclusions
Recent research on the free banking era, known for bank panics and
failures, has shown that regulations governing note issue contributed to bank
instability when bond prices dropped. Previous research (Dwyer and Hafer
2004; Jaremski 2010) has found that ex ante measures of risk are positively
associated with subsequent failure of Illinois free banks. We extend this
research to assess whether Illinois free bankers tried to prudently manage their
risks between Lincoln’s nomination in May 1860 and his election in November
1860 to avoid insolvency or reduce losses.
In a market of more than 100 banks, there was a spectrum of choices made
by the bankers. A significant segment—mainly established and experienced
banks—moved to reduce their risk exposure by increasing their purchases of
Northern bonds, diversifying bond holdings, reducing what bankers today
would call their VaR, and maintaining a reserve to protect noteholders. But at
least a third of the market was on the edge of being called, and a substantial
fraction of free banks held a significant portion of Southern bonds in their
portfolios even up to the election. The nomination of Lincoln did not dissuade
those free bankers from adding to their Southern holdings. Banks entering
after Lincoln’s nomination deposited twice as many Southern bonds as
Northern bonds.
We find several reasons that this continued tendency to buy or hold
Southern bonds did not reflect reckless behavior. Data on bond trading volume
from the time period indicate that Southern bonds typically carried a
significant liquidity advantage over Northern bonds. In addition, based on
yield-to-volatility ratios, Illinois banks could be interpreted as having taken
advantage of an attractive risk-expected return relationship. Historical bond
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prices indicate that a significant event—one out of a hundred—would not
impair their capital or bank note reserves to a degree that would render them
insolvent. In general, most bankers appeared to make defensible decisions
about managing their risk exposure. This banking market appears to have
reflected experience from the Panic of 1857 and a degree of uncertainty over
the period’s political situation. Some free bankers, accustomed to the calls by
the commissioners, appeared to have taken advantage of regulatory protocol
by holding negative reserve cushions. The political prognosticators in the
news and in the legislatures did not provide any clear guidance. It is possible
that many bankers were doing what many of us would have done in a similarly
complex situation—they were waiting to see what would happen next before
changing course. If that was the case, then they were less like groundhogs
lumbering across busy roads than previously thought and more like deer
caught in the headlights of a rural highway at night, soon to become “road
kill.”
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Appendix I: Data
Data on bank bond portfolio holdings were gathered from the Illinois auditor's
monthly bond registration ledgers. These ledgers recorded the date, state, and par
value of the free banks’ bonds as well as the dates on which banks withdrew the
bonds from their portfolios. The data in the ledgers served as the basis of the free
banks' annual reports to the legislature. We used the annual report of October of
1858 and the monthly registration ledgers to calculate monthly holdings and net
bond flows for all Illinois free banks from October 1858 to October 1860.
Bond price data were gathered from several sources, presented in Table A1.
Many price series come from the database presented in Dwyer, Hafer, and Weber
(1999), which those researchers gathered from the “Notes on the Money Market”
section of The Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Register as well as The New
York Times’ summary of daily trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Dwyer,
Hafer, and Weber’s data set is our main source of prices for Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, US, and
Virginia bonds. The data are weekly observations on those bonds’ prices from
January 1855 through November 1865. New York bonds and the Illinois “47”
series bonds are not included in Dwyer, Hafer, and Weber’s database, but The
Bankers’ Magazine contains these prices on a twice-per-month basis from early
1856 to through early 1859 and less frequently after that.
Although it primarily listed railroad security prices, the American Railroad
Journal also published some US and state security prices from 1856 to 1861. We
used this source for data from 1856 to 1859 on Illinois 47s, bonds from New York,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and Tennessee.
These prices allowed us to fill in some remaining gaps in our data and the Dwyer,
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Hafer, and Weber data. Finally, we included in our calculations some prices from
the data set posted on The Economic History Association’s Web site by Sylla,
Wilson, and Wright. We include from this data set prices on South Carolina,
Michigan, Minnesota, and Iowa bonds as well as prices on Illinois “6” (six percent
coupon) bonds.
The information for the vast majority of bonds was available. But for some
bonds, representing a small fraction of the Illinois banks’ portfolios, pricing data
were scarce. These bonds included those issued by Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota,
and South Carolina as well as some alternate issues from Illinois. While
recognizing there is a tradeoff between quality and quantity, we believe the latter
was more valuable in assessing ex ante portfolio risk. We decided to use as much
bond price information as possible, developing estimates of some missing prices
and approximations for some statistics. When information on state securities was
intermittent, prices were interpolated to fill the weekly gaps so that correlations
and price changes could be calculated.
In some cases, bond prices did not overlap for a limited number of periods,
making direct calculation of correlations impossible. In these cases, one of two
types of proxies were calculated. One was the multiplication of common
correlations. For instance, there were no overlapping prices for Michigan and
Illinois during one of the two year periods being examined. But correlations could
be calculated between Illinois and South Carolina, and between South Carolina
and Michigan for some of the observations. Thus a proxy for the correlation
between Illinois and Michigan was computed by their multiplication. A second
proxy was the substitution of a correlation that most reflected the two bonds.
Missing data on some of the Illinois bonds prevented direct calculation of their
correlations with other bonds. But data were available for two similar bonds from
New York, and we assume that price correlations between New York state bonds
would hold for Illinois state correlations. A simple average of the prices of the
two other Illinois state securities was used as a proxy for an Illinois bond issue,
the Interest 1860 bond, since default risk was likely similar to the other Illinois
bond issues and correlations should have been similar.
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Table A1: Price Data during the Antebellum Period
of Bonds Held by Illinois Banks
Source
Period
Bonds
Availability
Dwyer, Hafer, &
Weekly from
GA, KY, LA,
Consistent, occasional
Weber
1855-1861
MO, NC, OH,
missing observations
VA, TN, US
The Bankers’
Bimonthly
IL47, NY
IL47 and NY, scarce after
Magazine and
1855-1861
1859
Statistical Register
American Railroad
Weekly
GA, KY, LA,
IL47, NY: Consistent data
Journal
1856-1858,
MO, NC, OH,
1856-1859
3/1859
TN, IL47, NY
Others: Consistent, filled
missing observations from
Dwyer, et al. series
Sylla, Wilson, &
Weekly
SC, MI, MN, IA, IL6: 2 years, MI: Over 1 year
Wright
1857-1860
IL6
MN, IA: Less than 1 year
SC: Scattered for few months
at a time
Sources: Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr., et al. Weekly U.S. and State Bond Prices. Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/release?rid=264. J. Smith Homans, ed. The
Bankers’ Magazine and Statistical Registrar. Vol. 13 (Vol. 8 New Series) 1858-1859.
Henry Poor, ed. American Railroad Journal. Vol. 29-32: New York: J.H. Schultz, 18561859. Richard E. Sylla, Jack Wilson, and Robert E. Wright. "Price Quotations in Early
U.S. Securities Markets, 1790-1860." Economic History Association.
http://eh.net/database/early-u-s-securities-prices/
Appendix II: ARCH Modelling
Adapting the procedure introduced by Engle (1982), our ARCH(1) models specify the
conditional mean of a given bond’s price (Pt) as the sum of a constant (α) and an error term
(εt). The error is the result of a stochastic process, and the conditional variance (ht) of the
error depends on the squared values of the previous period’s error term (εt-1). Because the
variance of a random variable does not change with the addition of a constant, the
conditional variance of the price Pt is equal to the conditional variance of the error, ht, in
this formulation.
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜀𝑡
(1)
(2)
𝜀𝑡 = √ℎ𝑡 𝑒𝑡
2
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛾𝜀𝑡−1
(3)
𝑒𝑡 ~𝑁(0,1)
(4)
According to the ARCH(1) model, periods of calm are predicted after periods of
calm (when errors, εt. are small), while periods of high price volatility are predicted after
periods of high price volatility (when errors, εt. are large). We estimated the models’
parameters with the method of maximum likelihood using data from June 1858 through
November 1860.
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